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a city to promote itself on the global stage (Hall, 
2006) and raise its worldwide profile (Ponsford & 
Williams, 2010) through the international media 
(Boyko, 2008; Cegielski & Mules, 2002; Fredline, 
2005; Richards, Carlsen, Robertson, & Ali-Knight, 
2007; Small, Carlsen, Robertson, & Ali-Knight, 2007) 
as “it is through television that the world expe-
riences the Olympics” (Tomlinson, 1996, p. 583). 
With such expectation and the world’s eyes on the 
Introduction
Staging events has become increasingly impor-
tant as cities endeavor to promote their image and 
market themselves (Brown, Chalip, Jago, Mules, & 
Morgan, 2002; Deccio & Baloglu, 2002; Fredline 
& Faulkner, 2002; Jago, Chalip, Brown, Mules, & 
Ali, 2003; C. Jones, 2001). Hosting the Olympic 
Games in particular is viewed as an opportunity for 
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the athletes were also severely impacted by inade-
quate transport provision. Baseball games between 
Nicaragua and the US and between Japan and the 
Netherlands were delayed because the team bus was 
late, and one Olympic fencer arrived just 10 minutes 
before his competition was set to start (Applebome, 
1996). These transport fears resulted in the British 
rowing medal hopeful, Steve Redgrave, moving out 
of the Olympic Village, afraid that transportation 
would not deliver him to his venue on time ( Dobson 
& Sinnamon, 2001). These problems resulted in 
unfavorable media coverage and the President of 
the IOC, Juan Antonio Samaranch, being prepared 
to credit the Atlanta Games only as a “qualified suc-
cess” rather than the customary “best games ever” 
(Essex & Chalkley, 2003).
Importance of Transport
Mega-events and hallmark events provide great 
opportunities and the “Olympic Games are widely 
considered the most prestigious of these hallmark 
events, drawing global attention to host cities” 
(Ponsford & Williams, 2010, p. 17). However, they 
come with challenges as such events impose enor-
mous demands on the urban environment, in partic-
ular the local transportation infrastructure (Currie 
& Delbosc, 2011; Ritchie, 1984). These demands 
can result in general disruption and adverse social 
issues for local residents and businesses, including 
congestion (Barker, Page, & Meyer, 2002; Dwyer, 
Mellor, Mistilis, & Mules, 2000; Kim, Gursoy, & 
Lee, 2006; Ohmann, Jones, & Wilkes, 2006). The 
consequences of not accommodating the increased 
traffic volumes are so severe that political leaders 
are willing to put aside differences to create solu-
tions (Giuliano, 1992). The Olympics are expected 
to test the transport system to the limit, with con-
cerns “passed on from one Games to another almost 
as sacred as the Olympic Flame itself ” (Hensher & 
Brewer, 2002, p. 381).
The Olympic Games last for only 16 days. Large 
infrastructure projects to create additional transport 
capacity, therefore, cannot be justified on this basis 
alone. Investment for transport projects that would 
have been built at some time in the future to produce 
longer term benefits for the city (Kassens-Noor, 
2012) are brought forward for the Games. Such 
projects, promised by the authorities in order to win 
Olympic city, there is a need to ensure hosting such 
a mega-event appears as a faultless operation.
Holding the Olympic Games is also regarded as 
an opportunity for achieving rejuvenation, economic 
and social development, nation building, or leading 
the way to political liberalization (Jessop, 2002). 
However, Flyvberg, Bruzelius, and Rothengatter 
(2003) believe academics need to reflect critically on 
the effects of hosting these events, especially their 
social–cultural impacts (Boyko, 2008; Cegielski & 
Mules, 2002; Fredline, 2005; Richards et al., 2007; 
Small et al., 2007). Delivering the Games often 
requires government subsidies and places increased 
demands on public services (Chalip & Leynes, 
2002). Some argue that the reality of a mega-event, 
such as the Olympics, produces relatively few tan-
gible benefits for the average citizen, who may actu-
ally suffer increased costs (Hiller, 2000).
The Olympic Games are unequalled in their scale 
and potential impact (O’Brien, 2006) and, as a con-
sequence of their high profile, poor reputations can 
be especially enduring. Therefore, the “need to get 
it right” is vital (Dobson & Sinnamon, 2001). The 
Montreal Olympics is primarily remembered as 
being financially burdened, Atlanta as traffic con-
gested. The horrific events and images of Munich are 
still vivid in people’s memories (Schimmel, 2006).
Expected benefits, used to legitimize support for 
such events (Hiller, 2000), are largely dependent on 
its success. As a consequence of the competition 
between cities to host mega-events, the negative 
impacts are frequently ignored, with political lead-
ers and organizers glorifying the expected benefits 
(Gursoy & Kendall, 2006). The judgment of the costs 
and benefits of mega-events may be complicated by 
desires for distributive justice and differing values of 
the community (Fredline & Faulkner, 2002).
Transport Issues at Previous Olympic Games
Experiences from previous Olympic Games, in 
particular Atlanta 1996, highlight the transport prob-
lems faced by cities hosting mega-events. The Atlanta 
public transport system was not able to cope with 
the huge additional demands placed upon it (Bovy, 
2010). This resulted in severe delays and crowd-
ing for both the visitors to the Games and the host 
population (Currie, 1998). The problems were not 
restricted to those that had come to see the Games; 
 BUSINESS REACTION TO LONDON 2012 OLYMPIC GAMES 189
The gap in the literature is surprising given the 
importance that cities and regions place on gain-
ing the rights to hold mega-events, and the support 
that businesses are expected to provide to ensure 
the success of such events.
This article presents a case study on the impacts 
of the London 2012 Travel Demand Management 
(TMD) program on businesses in London. TDM 
is a technique used to manage specific increase in 
demand and is also a proven strategy for reducing 
recurrent demand (Tanaboriboon, 1994). Robbins et 
al. (2007) acknowledge “transport has not emerged 
as a core focus in the event management literature” 
(p. 303). The aim of this article, therefore, is to 
understand how businesses perceived the TDM pro-
gram and how they reacted to it in terms of plans for 
the Games period. Social exchange theory (SET) 
is used as a conceptual framework in the analysis 
of businesses’ response to this program. The theory 
is used to identify the cost–benefit relationship 
between business and the measures imposed. Due 
to the lack of previous research, this study is essen-
tially exploratory. The article reviews literature on 
past Olympic Games, Transport for London (TfL), 
and the Olympic Delivery Authority (ODA) reports 
for London 2012, and draws upon the results of a 
series of qualitative interviews with businesses that 
would be impacted by TDM measures in and around 
London. The threat of disruption to usual business 
operations are perceived at different levels and strat-
egies that are employed by businesses vary depend-
ing on their type, size, scope, and their ability and 
willingness to respond. This study demonstrates the 
importance of authorities in communicating policy, 
and the antecedents required to engage business are 
identified. Ap (1992) and Waitt’s (2003) SET mod-
els are adapted and a scale of acceptance dependent 
on business typology is proposed.
Transport Planning and Mega-Events
Transport is required to ensure that both partici-
pants and spectators are able to travel with the least 
inconvenience to and from the event (Robbins et al., 
2007). The traffic management program of the 1984 
Los Angeles Summer Olympics was a resounding 
success, providing most residents and visitors bet-
ter travel conditions than would normally have 
been experienced (Giuliano, 1992). The lesson of 
the bid for the Games (Currie & Delbosc, 2011), are 
referred to by Bovy (2010) as “Games accelerated 
transport projects” (p. 37). These have included: 116 
kilometers of new rail lines for Atlanta, new rail links 
to the coast and airport for Athens, and increasing 
the number of underground lines from two to eight 
in Beijing (Bovy, 2007). However, such additional 
capacity is rarely enough to cater for the extra trans-
port demand placed on the host city.
A mega-event is where the city’s transport system 
and urban logistics are seriously impacted by the pro-
ceedings (Bovy, 2007) and, as Bovy (2006) observed, 
a “highly robust and resilient transport system is a 
prerequisite for handling exceptional mega-event 
traffic demands, and the implementation for such 
measures plays a vital role in the bidding process for 
cities to host such events” (p. 34). History has shown 
that the degree of success of the transport provision 
for mega-events depends on not only the quality and 
capacity of the host city’s urban public transport net-
work, but also how the transport demand within the 
city is regulated (Currie &  Shalaby, 2011; Giuliano, 
1992). Regulating transport demand is an undertak-
ing that requires extensive planning and manage-
ment, and due to the fact that the Games is usually 
experienced only once in a lifetime in any one loca-
tion, planning for the Olympics is similar to “shoot-
ing in the dark” (Ponsford & Williams, 2010, p. 21). 
There are, therefore, exceptional transport planning 
management requirements.
This Project: Aims, Objectives, and Methods
Studies would suggest that residents’ attitudes 
towards impacts affects their support for such 
events (Ap, 1992; Cheng & Jarvis, 2010; Nunkoo 
& Ramkisson, 2012; Perdue, Long, & Allen,1990; 
Ward & Berno, 2011) and host communities ques-
tion to what extent the benefits of hosting mega-
events offsets the costs (Haxton, 1999). Strategies 
to accommodate mega-events, such as changing 
commuter behavior, create complex indirect effects 
on both workers and the work place (Giuliano, 
1992), as mega-event visitors share common loca-
tion and similar travel times as the host population 
(Robbins, Dickinson, & Calver, 2007). The impact 
of, and reaction to, disruption on transport created 
by mega-events on the host communities and, in 
particular, businesses, is an underresearched area. 
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travel planning, public transport marketing, and 
travel awareness campaigns. The success of such 
“softer policies,” also known as voluntary changes, 
has been limited (Loukopoulos, 2007),and research 
has tended to focus on road rather than public trans-
port use. Roby’s (2010) survey of 25 organizations 
identified that TPs are starting to become embed-
ded within business planning and are moving to a 
more strategic role within the company. Although 
not fully part of the organizations’ Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) agenda, Roby’s research did 
suggest that TPs, linked to environmental policy, are 
a growing consideration in CSR implementation.
Government encouragement of business to engage 
in transport planning is central to any TDM strategy, 
whether for long-term urban congestion issues or for 
short-term planning, for an event such as the Olym-
pics. TDM, including both hard and soft measurers, 
is used to accommodate the transport requirements 
that cannot be met by existing or planned infra-
structure developments. Methods used in previous 
games include:
Travel capacity creation measures—reduce demand •	
using a wide range of measures such as timing 
major events at weekends or public holidays.
Travel behavior change (or marketing) measures •	
—reduce travel or change travel mode to a more 
efficient means, such as public transport or higher 
occupancy vehicles.
Traffic efficiency measures—to improve traffic •	
flow/delays such as adjusting traffic signal set-
tings to maximize capacity and parking bans and 
tow truck use.
Traffic bans—to remove or exclude traffic.•	
Public transport emphasis measures—encourage •	
higher capacity and more efficient transport modes, 
such as rail transit, to carry large volumes of travel-
ers (Currie & Delbosc, 2011).
The previous four Summer Olympic Games have 
all, depending upon the existing level of transport 
infrastructure and the geographical and political ter-
rain of the host city, employed a range of TDM mea-
sures. As Table 1 demonstrates, these have proven 
highly successful in reducing “base load” demand, 
thus increasing the available capacity to handle the 
additional Olympic-generated travel. Sydney 2000 
altered the dates of the school holidays to reduce 
the Los Angeles Games have contributed to the 
development of Olympic TDM programs that have 
been used as a significant element in the transport 
planning for all Olympic games since Atlanta 1996 
(Currie & Delbosc, 2011). Planning for London 
2012 was no exception, and TDM measures were 
a core component of TfL and London’s Olympics 
Delivery Authority’s (ODA) strategy to accommo-
date the expected increase in travel demand.
The aim of TDM, referred to as “the art of modi-
fying travel behavior” (Ferguson, 1990, p. 442), is 
to maximize the people-moving capability of the 
transport system (Currie & Delbosc, 2011) and is 
reliant upon transport users changing their usual 
travel behavior. TDM is appealing to authorities as, 
at little or no cost in comparison to infrastructure 
projects (Bautz, 1988), transportation efficiency 
can be increased. The implementation process, the 
attitudes, ability, and readiness of users to com-
ply with such measures needs to be understood if 
such strategies are to be successfully implemented 
(Bhattacharjee, Haider, Tanaboriboon, & Sinha, 
1997). Authorities need the cooperation of the host 
city’s businesses for such policies to be successful 
as they have influence and control over a substan-
tial proportion of daily transport usage. Corporate 
stakeholder relationship and engagement is emerg-
ing as an important consideration for event man-
agement (Getz, 2002; Gursoy & Kendall, 2006; 
Ponsford & Williams, 2010) and, therefore, an 
understanding of business attitudes towards TDM 
and their willingness to engage is vital to ensure 
that future host city authorities can successfully 
implement these strategies.
Studies into business attitudes towards TDM 
are limited. However, research into work-based 
travel plans (TP) have been conducted. These have 
found that companies tended to implement a TP 
only when regulations required them to do so when 
faced with planning consent regulations, park-
ing restrictions, or congestion problems (Enoch & 
Potter, 2003). However, such “hard policies” were 
viewed by businesses as a cost, not a benefit, and 
companies engaged with them at the initial plan-
ning stage only to comply with regulations. TPs 
then tended to be relaxed and not actively promoted. 
This short-term effect has encouraged local govern-
ments to look at implementing a softer approach 
(Moser &  Bamberg, 2008), such as personalized 
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on the worry of “travel chaos” caused by the games 
to create “scare” stories that positively reinforce 
the message that travel behavior change is needed 
( Currie, Jones, & Woolley, 2013).
London 2012 and its TDM Program
Creation of the bid proposal to host the Olympics 
is often fast tracked, with cursory public consulta-
tion and incomplete evaluation of economic and 
social impact (Hall, 1992). As far back as 2003, 9 
years before the London Games was scheduled to 
start, transport was deemed an integral component 
of planning and, by the time of the bids’ submission, 
strategies to include transport infrastructure proj-
ects and the concept of a road network dedicated to 
Games traffic [the Olympic Route Network (ORN)] 
were already in place (Dosunmu, 2012). To ensure 
the delivery of the transport projects required by 
the Olympic governing body, the UK Government 
enacted the “London Olympics Act 2006.” The act 
removed specific powers from the local traffic author-
ities and allocated them to the ODA, an unelected 
organization set up specifically for the delivery of 
the Games (A. Jones & Woolley, 2013). In addition, 
the Act required the local highway, traffic, and street 
authority to obtain the consent of the ODA for any 
of its actions that may impact on the running of the 
2012 Games (House of Lords, 2005). The imple-
mentation of the Games transport strategy involved 
a range of stakeholders, principally the ODA, Lon-
don Organizing Committee of the Olympic Games 
demand and encouraged central business activ-
ity to relocate. To change behavior in Sydney, the 
authorities continually updated stakeholders about 
travel-related issues before and during the Games 
(Bovy, 2007). To increase traffic efficiency, Athens 
constructed a new traffic management center and 
implemented an extensive demand management 
system (Minis & Tsamboulas, 2008). To remove 
traffic, Beijing implemented strict behavior changes 
that involved an “odd and even” system that required 
cars to stay off the roads on alternate days, depend-
ing on whether their license plate ended in an odd 
or even number (Bovy, 2007). Additionally, every 
Games since Sydney has actively encouraged the 
use of public transport (Currie & Delbosc, 2011).
To engage the local population and business com-
munity, and gain their cooperation in reducing the 
“base load,” a comprehensive public awareness 
campaign is required. The Sydney authorities, with a 
strategy of “underpromise and overdeliver” through 
a single PR agency, implemented a clear, unam-
biguous promotion of travel behavior change. Part 
of this strategy has been described as scare tactics 
or the “Big Scare” (Currie, 1998). The “Big Scare” 
reinforces apprehensions about the “travel chaos,” 
which the Games might create in order to construc-
tively influence travel choices (Currie & Delbosc, 
2011). Although not an acknowledged TDM strategy, 
such tactics have been attributed to travel behavior 
change measures (Clean Air in London, 2011; 
Currie & Delbosc, 2011; Shawcross, 2011). The “Big 
Scare” is reliant upon a receptive media picking up 
Table 1
Summary of Estimated Base Load Demand Reduction—Olympic Games
Location/Year System-Wide Impact
Beijing 2008 Traffic volumes fell by 21% and average speed 
increased 27%
Total urban VKT dropped 32% and speed increased 
from 5 km/h to 37 km/h
Athens 2004 30% reduction in traffic levels on main roads
Salt Lake City 2002 Downtown traffic down 30% to 40% from normal levels
Sydney 2000 Road traffic volumes reduced by 10%–20% of normal 
weekday levels
Sydney’s general traffic decreased by 20%, 15% to 20% 
reduction in daily traffic
Atlanta 1996 Weekday total 24-h traffic counts decreased by 2.8%
Barcelona 1992 15%–20% reduction in congestion
Los Angeles 1984 4% background reduction on highways
Source: Currie and Delbosc (2011).
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The aims of the TDM project were to:
Manage expectations—setting reasonable pas-•	
senger and business expectations (i.e., plan your 
journey, plan to arrive early, expect delays).
Manage total demand at hotspots—encouraging •	
non-Games demand to reduce, retime, remode, 
or reroute their journey.
Help optimize the Transport Network—providing •	
passenger information with guidance and infor-
mation to help make best use of the available 
capacity.
Work closely with the business community—to •	
minimize background demand and ensure conti-
nuity of business operation.
Support transport reputation management— •	
transport becomes part of a positive Games story.
Provide legacy foundations—long-term behav-•	
ioral change, a legacy of sustainable travel (Olym-
pic Delivery Authority [ODA], 2012).
Although the overall aims of the TDM project were 
far reaching, the objective of the ODA’s TDM strat-
egy appears simplistic in comparison. Bannered as 
“to influence enough people enough,” its focus was 
to free up capacity on the existing transport system to 
allow for the increase in demand (ODA, 2012). This 
involved targeting the host population to reduce their 
overall travel use by working from home or chang-
ing their time, route, and mode of travel. Data from 
previous Olympic host cities identified an estimated 
20–25% reduction on usual non-Games demand 
would be needed. To achieve this target, the ODA 
(2012) estimated 35% would come from a reduction 
in the number of trips, 29% from changing the time 
of travel, 32% from altering the route, and 15% from 
changing the mode of travel. Four work streams were 
put in place to achieve these reductions:
Travel advice to business—advice to businesses 1. 
and other large trip-generating organizations.
Road freight management—managing back-2. 
ground freight demand at Games time.
Marketing and communications—travel aware-3. 
ness campaigns
Traveler information services—including an 4. 
online “Games Time Journey Planner” (GJP) and 
the provision of customer information (ODA, 
2012).
(LOCOG), Department of Transport (DFT), TfL, 
The Highways Agency, Network Rail, train operat-
ing companies, and local authorities.
Peter Hendy, London Transport Commissioner, 
alluding to the scale of the task, described the 
transport provision for the Olympics as “the largest 
peacetime logistics exercise” (Hendy, 2012). The 
2012 Summer Olympic Games, 16 days in duration, 
required a transport plan for handling an estimated 
additional 9 million visitors to London. Provision 
was also required for the expected 50,000 members 
of the Olympic Family; athletes, accredited media, 
and sports officials (Dosunmu, 2012). The require-
ment to “get it right” was vital for the success of 
the Games, and these additional visitors needed to 
be incorporated into a transport system that was 
already operating at near capacity.
The transport strategy included a number of 
key objectives: delivery of the ORN, enhancing 
the capacity of the public transport infrastructure, 
a multimodal Transport Coordination Center, a 
bespoke fleet of vehicles for the Olympics Games 
Family, and temporary enhancement to rail capacity 
and park-and-ride schemes (Dosunmu, 2012). Pro-
moted as “The Public Transport Games,” an impor-
tant element of the underlying sustainability theme 
of the Games was that all spectators were expected 
to take public transport, walk, or cycle (TNS-
BMRB, 2012). Where there was legacy value, per-
manent transport infrastructures were developed. 
The London Olympics 2012 provided the justifica-
tion for the continuation of a number of infrastruc-
ture projects that, as a result of the financial crisis 
of 2008, if not necessary for the Games success, 
could have been delayed or shelved entirely. These 
projects, involving £15 billion of transport invest-
ment, included the new Javelin high-speed train, an 
extension to the Docklands Light Railway, London 
Underground enhancements, and improvements 
to Stratford International and regional stations 
(Hendy, 2012; Kershaw, 2012). However, the abil-
ity to move the additional visitor load would also 
be reliant on enhancing the “existing capacity” of 
the system, utilizing TDM to reduce the base load. 
The London TDM policy, a temporary measure 
costing an estimated £30 million, was the largest in 
Olympic history (Currie et al., 2013), but must be 
viewed in comparison with the £15 billion that was 
invested in transport infrastructure projects.
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businesses that were reliant on the roads for their 
daily business operation. The closure of some roads 
and “no-stopping” restrictions due to the ORN 
would result is such business having no choice but 
to alter their normal working practices.
As can be seen from the above data, to cater for 
the Games, the ODA and TfL implemented a com-
prehensive transport strategy, a core component of 
which was their TDM program. The success of this 
program was largely reliant on regular, non-Games 
users altering their travel behavior. As businesses 
influence the daily travel routines of their employ-
ees, early engagement with this community had 
formed a major component of TfL’s TDM program.
Theoretical Framework
Social exchange theory, described by Emerson 
(1976) as a frame of reference that through the 
social process plots the flow of resources, implies 
a “two sided, mutually contingent, and mutually 
rewarding process involving ‘transactions’ or ‘sim-
ple exchange’” (p. 336). SET has been adapted and 
developed to study the fields of leisure (Searle, 1991), 
tourism (Ap, 1992), and events (Waitt, 2003). It has 
been used to identify the range of host populations’ 
attitudes, feelings, and evaluations towards impacts 
These programs commenced in 2009. The first 
public campaigns, mainly targeted at the business 
community, were launched in late 2010, with full 
activation and refinement of projects undertaken in 
late 2011.
Promotion of Travel Advice to Businesses
This study is primarily focused on the business 
community; the following gives a more detailed 
account of the travel advice to business work stream 
and a timeline of engagement.
Engaging with business (Table 2) was core to the 
ODA and TfL’s policy. As large companies con-
trolled travel patterns of a considerable numbers 
of employees’ a bespoke one-to-one consultancy 
was launched early in the program. To be effective, 
such organizations would require time to plan any 
changes that they may be able or willing to imple-
ment in their daily working pattern. Later in the 
program, a range of initiatives aimed at reaching a 
broader range of businesses that would be affected 
during the Games was implemented.
The TDM strategy involved influencing every-
day users of the transport system to alter their travel 
plans. Restrictions involving the road network 
would have impacts on freight organizations and 
Table 2
Travel Advice to Business Timeline
Date Activity Started Business Activity 
November 2010 Travel Advice to Business Toolkit—online information service 
for business.
November 2010 Site-specific advice program—a specialist one-to-one advice 
service for larger organizations with operations in identi-
fied hotspot areas; 533 companies signed up for this service, 
accounting for over 611,000 employees.
Presentations held by third parties and business intermediary 
groups; 333 presentations held, attended by 19,500 businesses.
Launch of “Keep on Running”—business information and 
awareness campaign.
July 2011 Workshops held for SMEs; 140 workshops were held and 
attended by 2,850 businesses.
January 2012 Intense program of travel advice to businesses and freight—mail 
drop to 45,000 businesses in central London.
Door to door leafletting; 25,000 SMEs in priority hotspots.
21 drop-in centers set up; 965 businesses made use of them.
Travel Advice to Business (TAB) newsletter; sent out to 10,000 
business and business intermediaries.
Source: ODA (2012); TfL personal communication, June 20, 2012.
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This study, set in a developed democratic soci-
etal landscape, would be better compared to Waitt’s 
(2003) study of the Sydney Olympics. Waitt used 
SET to research individuals’ reaction to tourism 
and mega-events, where the urban population 
would expect an exchange to counter the costs of 
the impact. Waitt (2003) identified these costs as 
including “overcrowding, traffic congestion, and 
route disruption” (p. 196).
The Sydney study identified that as the start 
of the Games neared, public perceptions regard-
ing the level of possible advantages in the form of 
economic benefits faded. However, the majority of 
residents still perceived the expected gains of the 
Games as outweighing the costs (Watt, 2003). This 
imbalance in the exchange could be explained by 
the concept of “altruism,” whereby there is rec-
ognition that, even though there is a cost to indi-
viduals, others, the collective group or society, can 
be seen to benefit (Faulkner & Tideswell, 1997). 
The concept of altruism is not evident in Cheng 
and Jarvis’ (2010) study of Formula 1 in Singapore, 
where residents identified similar costs but the per-
ceived positives were not valued highly enough to 
alleviate the imbalance in the exchange. The nature 
and impacts of the events, in this case Formula 1 
in comparison to the Olympics, and the differing 
social–cultural composition of the host communi-
ties play influencing roles in the exchange (Fredline 
& Faulkner, 2002).
The three altruistic themes that arose from 
Waitt’s (2003) research, “community and national 
spirit, international promotion, and future busi-
ness investment” (p. 209), show the Olympics is 
highly prized and, in this context, the wider posi-
tive benefits for the whole community and nation 
are deemed more important than the negative indi-
vidual impacts (Haralambopoulos & Pizam, 1996).
To understand and conceptualize business reac-
tion to transport policy and its perceived impact, this 
study employs Ap’s (1992) model of social exchange 
process (Fig. 1). Ap’s (1992) model, adapted from 
Searle (1991) and further adapted by Waitt (2003), 
identifies four antecedents: rationality, satisfying 
benefits, reciprocity, and the justice principle. These 
represent opportunities that need to be gained by at 
least one of the participants in the exchange rela-
tionship. Rationality is concerned with the reward/
benefit that the actor envisages the event would 
as a result of the received experiences (Ap, 1992; 
Cheng & Jarvis, 2010; Haralambopoulos & Pizam, 
1996; Nunkoo & Ramkisson, 2012; Pranic, Petric, 
& Cetinic, 2012; Waitt, 2003). The host popula-
tion will view the event as either positive or nega-
tive depending on the expected benefits they will 
receive or costs that they will incur as a result of 
the level of service/effort they employ. At a mac-
rosociological level, Emerson (1976) identified 
that the concept of exchange was useful to analyze 
labor relations, interorganizational relations, urban 
community structures, and political science. Ap 
(1992) believed SET was useful in examining posi-
tive and negative perceptions at the individual or 
collective level. In this context, it analyzes policy 
implementation and communities’ reaction. The 
authorities, in order to free capacity for Games-
related travel, required a reduction in commuters 
using the transport network. Businesses required 
the ability to operate as normal within a prosperous 
economic environment.
Faulkner and Tideswell (1997) highlighted intrin-
sic and extrinsic variables that impact in both the 
collective and individual exchange relationships. 
Intrinsic variables included host communities’ 
demographic characteristics, location in relation 
to the event, and perceived evaluation of fairness. 
Extrinsic variables involved overarching themes of 
destination cultural identity, level of industrializa-
tion, and the ratio of visitor to the host community. 
However, more recent studies criticize the value of 
extrinsic variables as their influence on responses 
are too varied to support a theoretical framework 
(Fredline & Faulkner, 1998). Impacts from and 
reaction to mega-events are not universal. The size 
and type of each event varies, as does the host com-
munity’s industrial and social development size of 
the destination and political regime (Baker, 2004; 
Fredline, 2005). Zhou and Ap’s (2008) study on the 
Beijing Olympics identified that residents’ support 
for the Games was very high despite the fact that 
93% of those surveyed were not consulted in the 
planning process, a factor not necessarily accept-
able in a less centralized society. This point is borne 
out by Pranic et al.’s (2012) study of the 2009 World 
Men’s Handball Championship in Croatia. Percep-
tions of the exchange are also seen to be reliant 
upon a sense of trust in the policy makers and event 
organizers (Nunkoo & Ramkisson, 2012).
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transport network, and businesses’ influence over 
the transport users.
Method
Given the lack of empirical research in this 
field, this work is essentially exploratory in nature, 
using a case study methodology. Yin (2003) pro-
motes case studies as a method that “arises out of 
the desire to understand complex social phenom-
ena” (p. 2). They are valuable for understanding the 
“how” and the “why.” Data for a case study “can 
include data from direct observation and systematic 
interviewing as well as public and private archives” 
(Yin, 2003, p. 249). Voss, Tsikriktsis, and Frohlich 
(2002) believe that case research can lead to “new 
and creative” insights and the development of the-
ory that is valid for practitioners (p. 195).
Qualitative research as a method was selected 
as it provides a “thick description,” which is the 
most appropriate to understand an organization’s 
reaction to external impacts. The term “thick 
description” is used for texts that are salient for ana-
lytical interpretations (Geertz, 1973). In addition, 
 qualitative research provides for in-depth analysis 
bring while satisfying benefits demands that posi-
tive benefits must reach a satisfactory acceptance 
level. In the reciprocity, the exchange is evaluated 
in terms of equality. The justice principle employs 
the view that the exchange is underpinned by the 
concept of fairness and trust. The level of positive/
negative reaction is dependent on the level of con-
trol or influence within the exchange relationship 
(Ap, 1992; Sutton, 1967). Positive outcomes occur 
when the relationship is in balance, both participants 
have high levels of control, and there is an equal 
level of benefit. Negative reactions are experienced 
when participants have lower levels of control or 
influence, and little or unequal gain is expected 
from the exchange. Negative reactions result in the 
participants withdrawing and no exchange occurs, 
whereas a positive outcome will reinforce future 
behavior and exchange relations. The Olympics is a 
once-in-a-life-time event; therefore, the immediate 
exchange relationship, rather than future exchange, 
is important.
Wrong (1979) believes that power within SET 
relates to having controlling or influencing resources 
that someone else needs. In this study, resources 
involve the authorities’ control of and access to the 
Figure 1. Model of social exchange theory. Source: Ap (1992).
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were identified as direct beneficiaries of the Games 
as their attitudes and reactions to the impacts could 
have been skewed. The researchers were not aware 
when selecting the sample or during the research if 
any of the organizations had bid to become sponsors 
or a beneficiary but were unsuccessful.
Businesses in the study ranged in size from sole 
traders to midsized businesses employing 100s, 
to multinationals employing 1,000s. Respondents 
were recruited using a combination of convenience 
sampling of contacts known to the researchers and 
snowball techniques. Convenience sampling is a 
practical method of securing respondents whereas 
snowball sampling (also known as chain-referral 
samples; Heckathorn, 2002) enables recruitment of 
those who are willing, able, and appropriate.
The sectors sampled included those involved with 
financial services, professional services, wholesalers, 
and those operating in the field of logistics. Though 
not all were aware of the issues before the research 
commenced, in all cases it had been identified by 
the researchers that due to their location, the busi-
ness would be impacted by TDM measures. Inter-
views were conducted with respondents who either 
had responsibility or were involved in preparing the 
organization for possible impacts of the Olympics. 
For small and medium-sized organizations, intervie-
wees were either managing directors or members of 
the senior operational team, such as HR directors or 
senior partners. Larger organizations provided access 
to those whose role included responsibility for or 
involvement with business continuity. To facilitate 
the interview process, and cause as little disruption 
as possible to respondents, the researchers visited the 
participants in their offices in London.
The researchers also interviewed an organiza-
tion representing small business, the Federation of 
Small Business (FSB). The FSB provided data on 
a segment whose response to the impact of TDM 
and the Olympics would be hard to capture on an 
individual level. In addition, a property manage-
ment company that represented a large number of 
businesses in a central London location was inter-
viewed. These provided an overarching view that 
helped confirm the accuracy of the findings of the 
sample. Representatives of TfL’s TDM department 
were also interviewed to supplement secondary 
sources and provide insight into the TDM process 
and measures being implemented.
required to understand the reactions and decisions 
of businesses.
Data was collected from a variety of sources 
that, as Yin (2003) states, increases the reliability 
of the data. Initially, secondary data was collected. 
These data included the marketing and promotional 
material produced by the ODA, TfL, and other 
relevant authorities. Press releases and articles 
from the broadcast media that were in the public 
domain were also analyzed. These secondary data, 
especially the promotional material, provided the 
context and basis for evaluating the situation from 
a public perspective and was used to design some 
of the interview questions. Analysis of a variety 
of publically available sources such as web sites, 
documents, and presentations allows researchers to 
substantiate findings (Ponsford & Williams, 2010). 
The reports and publicity material, especially those 
produced by the ODA and TfL, may be regarded 
as promoting a positive view on their policy. These 
publications were used by TfL as an impetus for 
organizations to consider engagement with TDM 
requirements and therefore provide data and infor-
mation on their campaign.
Interviews were selected as the means of col-
lecting primary data as they allow the researcher 
to probe further and gain a greater understanding 
of levels of engagement, reactions, and attitudes. 
Interviews provide an opportunity to identify incon-
sistencies and also provide a greater understanding 
of the reasons for them (Pettigrew, 1990). Fontana 
and Frey (1994) argue that structured interviews 
capture data that is codeable and precise, whereas 
unstructured interviews provide greater depth and 
understanding. In order to gain the benefits of both 
depth and coding, semistructured in-depth inter-
views were used, which, as Yin (2003) agrees, pro-
vide a “rich dialogue with the evidence” (p. 59).
The research required nonrandom sampling in 
order to “maximize understanding of the phenom-
enon” (Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2007, p. 111). Miles 
and Huberman (1994) defined 16 purposeful sample 
strategies, including one sample that “illustrates sub-
groups and facilitates comparisons” (p. 28). This 
sample technique was selected to enable analysis 
of the reaction of businesses impacted by TDM 
measures. The sample was varied by business size, 
sector, and geographical location. The sample spe-
cifically excluded businesses, such as sponsors, that 
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How they planned to react to these measures 2. 
and why.
How they felt about the demands being made 3. 
of them and the anticipated effect on their 
business.
Business Engagement
Many of the businesses that were interviewed 
identified that transport in London would be a sig-
nificant issue for their operation during the Games. 
Right from the time of the announcement that London 
had won the bid to hold the Games, some questioned 
the decision to accommodate such a mega-event in 
an already congested city. “I must say I was a bit 
negative about it, [bidding for the Games] because I 
thought we can’t even run the transport system, and 
London is a nightmare to deliver around” (Howard, 
small fresh produce business).
Larger organizations, with in-house business 
continuity departments, started their initial plan-
ning processes 2 years before being formally 
contacted by TfL’s one-to-one consultancy, Site-
Specific Advice Program. All the large organiza-
tions that were interviewed, companies in excess 
of 2,500 employees and located in central London, 
took advantage of the consultancy offered. They 
appreciated the bespoke service. However, some 
questioned the additional value provided. This 
could be attributed to the fact that these organi-
zations had extensive business continuity depart-
ments whose role is to plan for such eventualities. 
“To be honest, I don’t think that we benefited. I 
don’t think there is anything that they pointed 
out that we wouldn’t have had on our radar any-
way” (Adam, banking 1). Others believed “We 
were getting their best practice—or understanding 
best practice from what others were doing” (Sean, 
financial services).
This one-to-one planning policy provided TfL the 
opportunity to ensure that companies had a compre-
hensive understanding of the problems involved.
They (TfL) sort of ran over the rational for their 
role . . . in trying to enable London to run as a city 
and at the same time as making sure the Olympics 
worked as a Games . . . and they really said—you 
have a choice, you either communicate with peo-
ple and buy into this and do it . . . or it will be very 
disruptive. (Sean)
Primary data from 15 semistructured interviews 
taking place between February and June 2012 were 
collected. These interviews lasted from 25 minutes 
to 1 hour 20 minutes. All were, with permission, 
digitally recorded and transcribed. Each intervie-
wee received a standard interview guide explain-
ing the intention of the research and the areas that 
would be covered. The interview guide provides 
assurance to the interviewee that the researcher is 
competent and ensures the interview concentrates 
on the phenomena being investigated (Meuser & 
Nagel, 2002). The guide contained 10 questions 
to understanding the context of the organization, 
gather information on the interviewees’ level of 
awareness of TDM, and ascertain the company’s 
planning for the impacts of the Games. All inter-
views were attended by both researchers, which 
allowed for shared perspectives to be discussed and 
contrasted postinterview (Roper, 2004).
The data were analyzed iteratively both during 
and after collection. Notes were made after each 
interview before transcripts were created, as Miles 
and Huberman (1994) state that this allows allow 
for a “perspective that combines immediacy with 
a reflective overview of what went on” (p. 52) and 
the process may identify questions to be asked 
of the next interviewee. Analysis of the data fol-
lowed the steps identified by Auerbach and Silver-
stein (2003), where repeating ideas were grouped 
together and then organized into themes that could 
then be grouped into abstract categories.
Findings
The cornerstone of TfL’s TDM strategy was to 
“encourage enough businesses enough,” which 
was dependent on successful business engagement. 
It is important to understand how businesses were 
engaged. Did they understand the message, what 
was their reaction, and what were their plans and 
responses? For the future planning of mega-events, 
it is necessary to reflect on the strategy employed 
by TfL, and evaluate why businesses reacted in the 
manner in which they did and their attitude to TDM. 
Our research findings have been broken down into 
three sections:
How businesses had been informed and their 1. 
level of understanding of the impact of TDM.
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commented on this picture, which they believed 
very clearly portrayed a worst case scenario. When 
asked their opinion on why TfL used this image, they 
believed it was to shock them. “Possibly it was all 
to totally terrify us and make us go ‘God, we have 
got to do something!’ ” (Claire). The image had the 
effect of confirming the level of the disruption that 
could be created. “I do think that the figures were 
quite scary. So I trusted that—that it was the right 
[thing to do] I did come out of that thinking ‘phew, 
we need to do something’ about it” (Claire).
The research identified that engagement between 
TfL and small business was, to a large extent, initi-
ated by the businesses themselves. Tim, from the 
London branch of the FSB, stated that they had to 
contact the authorities first. “We have been heavily 
involved on the lobbying and transport side (TfL 
and Locog), in particular to do with the Olympic 
and the Paralympic Route network.” This was fur-
ther confirmed by Lilly, marketing services busi-
ness owner, “No, no, it has not been raised with me 
by anybody, you know, like TfL.” Don, fish market 
representative, believed that it was only after he 
raised concerns with the press of the impacts from 
the ORN that TfL got in contact. “Words were spo-
ken here there and everywhere, I think, to Trans-
port for London, and we had a meeting with them, 
within the next fortnight from that interview with 
Reuters” (Don).
Once engagement was initiated, both Don and 
Tim applauded the level of effort TfL undertook to 
help in preparation for the predicted transport dis-
ruption. “And they [TfL] have made people avail-
able and, we have had two or three sessions in the 
market here with all the traders present, able to ask 
questions” (Don).
Small businesses, which, as Tim stated “by their 
very nature are short-termist,” are difficult to engage 
and, therefore, required a different approach.
They realize they [TfL] are not pulling enough 
small businesses to the seminars that they would 
like, so they are going to them and knocking on 
doors, and having discussion there on the business 
premises and that is what we want to see. (Tim)
London’s small businesses are a diverse group 
and it proved difficult for TfL to formally engage 
with them all. Therefore, much of the informa-
tion they received was via the press. Stories that 
These large organizations clearly understood 
TfL’s message and the role they could play in 
ensuring transport disruption was kept to a mini-
mum, thus in turn minimizing the adverse effects 
on their business continuity.
TfL’s policy for engaging medium-sized busi-
nesses was centered on the involvement of a third 
party. These third parties, which included profes-
sional bodies, large suppliers, and Olympic spon-
sors, invited businesses to workshops where TfL 
presented their “Keep on Running” for business 
program. The objectives of which were “to deliver 
a great Games” and to “keep London moving” 
(ODA, 2010). The message was communicated 
through a PowerPoint presentation depicting the 
extensive level of research and modeling under-
taken by TfL. This predicted the delays on the 
public transport network and detailed the restric-
tions and expected impacts of the ORN. Informa-
tion presented gave, by underground and railway 
station, the anticipated delay times if there was no 
reduction in the base load and how the length of 
the delay would be reduced depending upon per-
centage decrease in the base load. The clear mes-
sage from the presentation was that the problems 
that occurred due to poor transport planning at past 
Olympics, in particular Atlanta 1996, would not 
happen if businesses engaged with TDM measures 
to reduce, retime, remode, and reroute.
Some businesses were surprised that TfL was 
not providing additional capacity and was expect-
ing businesses to take on the responsibility to help 
reduce the base load. “It was billed as a review of 
the contingency plans that TfL had in place for 
the Games period . . . the message I got out of it 
was actually there is no contingency plan” (Simon, 
engineering consultancy). Simon reinforced this by 
saying that the message given was clear: “if you 
change your working practices, it will be a lot eas-
ier for everyone else.”
The most poignant aspect of the presentation, 
identified by both large and medium-sized busi-
nesses, was an image portraying thousands of spec-
tators reportedly queuing for a train (Fig. 2). “They 
showed us this picture, it was of the Atlanta Olympic 
Games, that is how not to do it, people were tak-
ing 9 hours” (Simon). “People were queuing up to 
8 hours to get on to a train. It was a fantastic photo-
graph” (Claire, architect’s practice). All voluntarily 
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result, businesses were very worried that the mes-
sage being received was that “London is not open 
for business” (Tim). There was also considerable 
confusion over the length of time the ORN would 
be in operation. Those directly affected by it origi-
nally understood that the restrictions would be 
imposed for 100 days. Don’s initial reaction (to the 
Olympics) was:
We are thrilled to bits apart from the fact that the 
roads are going to be restricted for 100 days. It 
would have a devastating effect, it will be a very, 
very sad day if the outcome of the Olympics was 
to do something that two world wars could not, 
close the market. 
When TfL corrected this misinformation, these 
companies were able to create more realistic plans. 
“When it was relaxed down to 2 days before and 
2 days after, everybody has breathed a sigh of relief. 
It is not a problem, we can cope with it” (Dave, 
logistics).
appeared in the media played a not-insignificant 
role in informing and shaping opinions of the antic-
ipated disruption to the transport system. Press 
articles, depicting a negative image of the possible 
problems to the public transport system, could aid 
TfL in achieving its objectives. Sean believed such 
stories helped gain management attention. “An 
article appears front page of the [London Evening] 
Standard, and, all of a sudden, our lead partnership 
is going ‘hang on, maybe we do need to focus a bit 
of attention on this at this time.’ ”
TfL claimed to have little or no influence over the 
media and some stories that were circulating were 
described as hysteria. “A lot of it is scare mongering 
really, we think. The information being put out that 
you are not going to be able to use the majority of 
the London road network is quite a myth, actually” 
(Tim).
Such inaccuracies, although raising awareness, 
can develop hostile reactions to the Games and 
be counter to the communication objectives. As a 
Figure 2. Picture of event crowding presented by TfL—said to be Atlanta 1996 Games. From Haxton PA. 
Olympic Games. Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Sydney. University of Technology 1999. The Perceived Role 
of Community Involvement in the Mega-Event Hosting Process: A Case Study of the Atlanta 1996 and 
Sydney 2000 Olympic Games. (This picture was presented to the Olympic Delivery Authority by Professor 
Currie on February 2, 2010. It was adopted by TfL in their TDM program but incorrectly associated with 
the Atlanta 1996 games. It is a photograph from St Louis, MO, USA.)
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was at first reluctant to reduce but became more 
compliant once the one-to-one consultancy allowed 
them to understand fully the implications for their 
business. Sean asked TfL “How aggressive do you 
want us to be in terms of people coming into our 
office, what sort of message do you want us to try 
and achieve?” TfL’s response was clear: “Go for 
reduce—go for reduce as hard as you can, as there 
are so many organizations who cannot reduce. We 
would suggest for your benefit, and for the bigger 
picture, that you reduce as much as possible.” This 
large financial service organization, out of a work 
force of 5,000, was planning “at least a 60–70% 
reduction in heads.” They planned virtually to close 
their main office to client contact. Our research 
identified that such large organizations, due to their 
flexible working patterns, were able to reduce using 
a combination of additional leave, a working from 
home policy, and relocation.
TfL’s strategy of targeting large organizations 
appeared to have the desired effect in helping to 
ensure that a sizable percentage of the workforce 
was given the opportunity to either remode, reroute, 
retime, or, importantly, reduce. However, not all 
the large organizations that we interviewed were 
so compliant. Although all large companies had the 
benefit of the one-to-one consultancy service, one 
of the large organizations we interviewed, which 
employed over 2,500 staff in central London, did 
not feel able or willing to make the changes to 
their business operations. They did put in place 
contingency plans for senior executives to stay in 
hotels or work from an out-of-town office. How-
ever, as Mark (banking 2) said “We won’t be shift-
ing people to [work from] home.” The company 
had not ignored the problem as they had regular 
crisis management meetings and HR communica-
tions to staff. They adopted the position that it was 
their employees’ responsibility to make arrange-
ments to get to work on time. “The fact that you 
are late for work, you cannot blame the Olympics 
for it, it is about you adapting to additional time 
elements” (Mark).
Although Mark’s organization was not comply-
ing with TfL’s requests, they did plan to review 
the situation during the Games. Due to their meet-
ings with TfL, they understood that there would be 
transport issues as their main office building was 
located directly on the ORN. However, their policy 
Proposed Actions as a Result of Engagement
Businesses’ ability and willingness to cooperate 
and implement TDM measures varied depending 
on the size, location, nature, and level of autonomy 
over their operations. Large businesses that, due to 
their global presence, had experience of previous 
Olympics could, as Sean explained “replicate their 
governance structure and decision-making process 
that they had in their Sydney office.” Such compa-
nies did not appear to require such a personalized 
level of help from TfL. However, it was evident that 
TfL needed to be sure that these large organizations 
were clearly informed, proactive, and engaged. The 
level to which these larger businesses were asked 
to engage was borne out by Sean: “And they came 
to us and said, you know we are looking for orga-
nizations across London to reduce their August-
on–August transport by 40%.” The target requested 
by TfL ranged from 30% to 40% reduction on the 
base load at peak times. Barry (property manage-
ment company) confirmed this: “We are going to 
be looking at about a 30–35% reduction of people 
[on a total of 110,000 commuters] coming into the 
estate at peak times.”
For the large organizations contacted, most felt 
confident that they could reach the target if not 
exceed it. These companies were already imple-
menting flexible working practices.
We have working from home as part of our gen-
eral “business as usual” strategy for most business 
areas. So what we are saying is, use this as part 
of your resource planning for the Olympics. You 
have got full executive support to do that. (Adam)
Although working from home would provide the 
largest percentage reduction in the base load, other 
aspects of the TDM strategy were being positively 
promoted. Adam requested employees to “Think 
about coming into work earlier and leaving earlier 
or coming in later and leaving later, working from a 
different location. Alter the way you travel, to walk-
ing, cycling, river boat.” In the main, these large 
organizations were happy to go beyond the initial 
request from the transport authorities. “We will be 
anticipating around 60% of our normal business as 
usual (BAU) population—a drop by 40%” (Adam). 
This figure would relate to a reduction of 6,000 on 
a population of 15,000 employees. Sean’s company 
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Other medium-sized organizations, not forced into 
compliance due to ORN restrictions, held a differ-
ent view. Although the message from TfL was clear, 
their reactions varied. Responses ranged from “busi-
ness as usual,” “No one was really bothered because 
we just have to get people into the office” (Simon), 
to “business as unusual,” changing working hours, 
“so rather than starting at 9 o’clock we are looking 
at shifting that person, who is seriously affected, [to] 
starting at 12 and finishing at 8” (Claire).
These companies did not discuss reducing. There 
was no option of working from home; the responsi-
bility was passed to their employees, who either had 
to get in on time for their normal working hours, or 
for an agreed “flexible” work pattern.
However, all the companies that were contacted 
thought they could use the Olympics to bring some 
positive benefits to their organization and employ-
ees. It would be used to “help enthuse the spirit of 
the Olympics and help incentivize people to want 
to come to work” (Claire). Other organizations 
went further. “Actually, we have given everyone an 
‘Olympic Day’ so they can take one day off during 
the 2-week period” (Jonathon, PR agency). Some 
wanted to promote the festival spirit: “we will put 
lots of tellys up and have lots of drinks, make a bit 
of a party of it” (June, film production). In general, 
medium-sized businesses understood the situation 
and, unless they were forced to change due to the 
ORN, there was little other than limited retiming 
that they were prepared to do.
Small and microbusinesses found it difficult to 
change. If a business has “two members of staff and 
they need to be in central London, they just can’t 
shut operations otherwise their business will fold” 
(Tim). Tim identified that the “negative impact of 
transport is the major concern of our members.” 
Surveys carried out by the FSB reported that these 
organizations were increasingly nervous about 
transport and parking issues as a consequence 
of the ORN. Research of their members identi-
fied that “negative impacts have gone from 25% 
in May 2011 to 50% in December 2011” (Tim). 
Small businesses felt themselves powerless to plan 
in advance. “If you speak to a lot of London busi-
nesses, that is it, they are going hand to mouth and 
it is day to day at the moment” (Tim). As Howard 
emphasized: “It is up to the individual operators to 
look out for themselves.”
was one of “it is really ‘suck it and see’ and see 
what does actually happen on day 1” (Mark).
For the medium-sized organizations interviewed, 
their response to TDM requirements depended on 
their working practices, the level of engagement 
they received from TfL, and their evaluation of the 
level of impact they anticipated the transport dis-
ruption would have on their ability to operate as 
normal.
Organizations in which their business was reli-
ant on access to the road network had no option but 
to consider altering their operation. A fish market, 
comprising 150 separate traders, employing 500 
staff, and directly located on the ORN, undertook 
a complete review of their procedures. “The whole 
operation is going to be brought forward by a cou-
ple or 3 hours—but it is going to need a lot of coop-
eration by a lot of people within the trade” (Don).
These changes would also impact many of their 
stakeholders. “There are hundreds of people in the 
market, but of course, transport officials, coastal 
suppliers—there are thousands of people that will 
be affected. In fact, we have to find a way of getting 
through it because it is a matter of survival” (Don). 
There was uncertainty concerning how successful 
their contingency planning would be able to cope 
as they were operating in an unknown environment. 
“Literally take it day-by-day and I know it is an old 
cliché but it is going to be that way” (Don).
TfL promoted the ORN as affecting a minimal 
percentage of London’s roads. Although they say 
only 1% of London’s roads will be taken up by the 
ORN, which is true, it just happens to be that this 
1% of London’s streets are the major routes and 
the major arteries which will affect us. (Dave)
This company planned to alter their operation “to 
work around these peaks, those that can take deliv-
ery out of hours we will be delivering out of hours. 
We will try and stockpile on site where it will not 
affect progress” (Dave). This approach was con-
sistent with that taken by the freight industry: “the 
collective view [of the freight industry] is there was 
going to be a problem and they were prepared to do 
whatever was necessary, working with TfL to over-
come the problems” (Dave). There was recognition 
by these organizations that they had no option but 
to change and engage with TDM as they had no 
control over the ORN restrictions.
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Although these companies questioned the sever-
ity of the problem, and recognized that they may 
well have incurred additional costs or loss of rev-
enue, they believed that they had a responsibility 
to help ensure the Games were a success. “As a 
good citizen of London, it’s what we should do; 
it’s our ‘London responsibility,’ our ‘London social 
responsibility.’ You could say it’s part of our Corpo-
rate Social Responsibility (CSR) program” (Paul, 
finance industry group).
This attitude was not true of all large organiza-
tions. “Well, at the end of the day, we have a busi-
ness to maintain” (Mark). They adopted a position 
that “there is a business case that has to be built 
for that, and the Olympics is not a justifiable busi-
ness case” (Mark). The different responses to the 
engagement policy, made by similar large busi-
nesses, highlight the complexity of TfLs objective 
of “influencing enough people enough.”
Medium-sized businesses had limited scope or 
expertise to enable them to voluntarily alter their 
business operations. However, when they had no 
option but to comply, they developed contingency 
plans. These companies were initially “horrified” 
when they heard about the restriction of ORN and 
believed it could result in serious consequences. 
“The initial report told us it [ORN] was going to 
be 100 days—it would have a devastating effect” 
(Don). Once TfL started their engagement, clarify-
ing the full implications of the ORN, they “were 
prepared to do whatever was necessary working 
with TfL to overcome the problems” (Dave). This 
was true even though these changes could impact 
on their profitability.
There will be some additional operating costs, but 
we also know we have a client base and a very 
loyal client base, and we have to provide a service 
during this period. If it costs 1% or 2% more—
then that is something we have got to take on the 
chin. (Dave)
There was a realization that, due to transport 
restrictions, they would be unable to take full 
advantage of the possible benefits of holding the 
Olympics in London. “We would love to show the 
market off, unfortunately, these hundreds or thou-
sands or millions of people won’t be able to get to 
see us” (Don).
Businesses’ Attitudes Towards TDM
The attitude of business varies from fully sup-
portive of TfL’s TDM policy, willing and able to 
help, to being unsympathetic to the requests and 
demands and extremely concerned by the possible 
impact on their business. Our research indicates 
this difference could be attributed to factors such 
as the amount of disruption that they envisaged, the 
level of control over their operation, and the degree 
of influence and involvement they had in the rela-
tionship with the transport authorities.
Large organizations, as part of their normal busi-
ness operation, were aware of the implications 
of TDM and had plans in place to alleviate most 
eventualities. As Brian (banking 1) explained, “It is 
part of your year, [it’s] in the calendar. The Olym-
pics is just an additional one that has been put in 
there where we have had to place more emphasis.” 
When discussing their preparations for the possible 
impacts and changes required for the disruption, a 
“corporate memory” is referred to:
There is an element of corporate memory involved 
with this as well, in that, not to put too fine a point 
on it, but Adam and I sitting in a room between us 
[we] could probably think of 99% of all the issues 
and what the solutions would be when these things 
happen. (Brian banking 1)
Such organizations were able to gain confidence 
from past experience, have the resources to enable 
them to plan, and were, therefore, able and willing 
to support TfL in its TDM objectives.
Interesting to note is the extent to which large 
businesses were prepared to help TfL in reducing the 
base load. These organizations were willing to go 
even further than originally requested “for the bigger 
picture benefit” (Sean). To achieve this, companies 
agreed to employ drastic measures, which could have 
a negative effect on their business. “This building is 
closed for client meetings, only a skeleton popula-
tion, we would expect our profitability to struggle 
directly because of the Olympics” (Sean). Prepara-
tions were being made even though there was doubt 
that the congestion problems may not be that great. 
“No, I don’t think they [senior management] think it 
is going to be bad. I think that they just want us to be 
prepared” (Adam).
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which could be attributed to TfL’s limited and late 
engagement with them. “Some of them will be able 
to [adjust], through gritted teeth” (Tim). It is not sur-
prising that these businesses were concerned as the 
imposition of the ORN was adding to the challenges 
of operating in difficult economic times.
Yes, it is really sort of dog-eat-dog at the moment 
and you have to keep your customers. And if they 
say no, and insist that it gets there at the normal 
time of eleven o’clock in the morning, somehow 
you have to work to that. (Howard)
Although small businesses worried about the 
immediate impact, they were still hoping that the 
Olympics would be good for London in the longer 
term.
We genuinely hope that there will be this bounce, 
that won’t just be seen through the Games but after 
it. Particularly on the tourism side, it will be felt 
for years to come. There is kind of a 2-year period 
where we think that London has that kind of place 
in the sun. And we do hope that we see those long-
term benefits—whether it is procurement or just 
people coming to invest in London. (Tim)
Analysis
The results have indicated that businesses’ 
implementation of TDM depended on the level of 
engagement they received from TfL. This directly 
impacted on their understanding of the require-
ments of the policy, their perceived influence and 
control over their ability to comply, and their atti-
tude towards the impacts of the measures.
Figure 3 depicts a proposed decision-making 
process model developed from the findings of 
this research that describes the process by which 
businesses evaluated their response to TDM mea-
sures. This is adapted from Ap (1992) and Waitt’s 
(2003) models of social exchange that were related 
to  tourist events where the type of event, length 
of operation, location, and number of participants 
influences the initiation of the exchange.
The Olympics is normally a one-off engagement 
that requires specific policies to be implemented, 
in this instance TDM. The level of engagement by 
authorities directly affects businesses’ evaluation of 
the antecedents of rationality, reciprocity, satisfying 
Despite the negative impacts, the consensus view 
was supportive of hosting the Games in London. “As 
a company, [if] it is the question, would we rather 
have had the Olympics in Paris or [in London] we 
would rather have them in London?” (Dave). “So 
yes, in spite of all the pessimism about the timings, 
and goodness me, how we are going to get through 
all this, there is still a great enthusiasm” (Don).
Medium-sized companies not impacted by road 
restrictions, and those that were implementing only 
a limited retiming policy, were originally surprised 
by the message from TfL. “So, the emphasis is 
clearly on businesses changing the way we oper-
ate over that period of time. And I think that didn’t 
necessarily go down well with people” (Simon). 
These organizations, mostly professional services, 
were confident in relying on their staff’s resilience 
to overcome whatever traffic disruption occurred. 
“And I think given the experience when it snows, 
when there are transport crises, and when there 
are tube strikes, 95% to 100% of our staff gets in 
every day. We are taking a bit of the same attitude” 
(June).
Those companies operating “business as usual” 
recognized that they were also relying on other 
companies complying with TDM measures. “I am 
hoping some people will take the advice and work 
at home, give us some sort of space [on the trans-
port network]” (June).
The overall attitude of medium-sized businesses 
when asked to consider their reaction to the Olym-
pics being held in London was also positive. “So, I 
think for London PLC it is a really good idea. Lon-
don is going to be buzzing and it is going to be fun” 
(Jonathon). “We want the Olympics to be success-
ful. We are quite proud so, you know, if we have 
to put up with a bit of hassle then that is absolutely 
fine, as long as it doesn’t fundamentally affect our 
business” (Lilly).
Small businesses were the most fearful of the 
impacts of the TDM measures, the ORN in par-
ticular. They had little influence over the changes 
that were being imposed by the authorities. The 
short-term nature of their business, and with limited 
resources, meant they had few options with regard to 
how they could change their business operation; they 
also had little influence over their customers. These 
businesses were fearful of the impacts of the Games, 
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effective, personalized service targeted only a 
relatively small number of organizations, the lat-
ter all had influence over a sizable proportion of 
“non-Games demand” (their employees) and were, 
therefore, able to significantly help TfL meet its tar-
gets. Although TfL’s overall objective was a 20% 
reduction in traveling, they asked these businesses 
to reduce by between 30–40%, and it is notewor-
thy that in some instances businesses responded 
with a plan that would deliver a 50–70% reduction. 
These businesses felt TfL’s demands were justified 
and through the personalized service were kept 
involved and in control of their plans. The evalua-
tion of the exchange was positive, all antecedents, 
including the justice principle, being realized, cre-
ating a balanced exchange with companies feeling 
in control. This may explain why such businesses 
were happy to go beyond TfL’s initial request, even 
though they would not directly benefit financially 
from the Games and may well incur additional 
costs. These organizations and TfL developed a 
“mutually contingent relationship” (Emerson, 1976, 
p. 336), each recognizing the benefits of their 
exchange. There could also be an altruistic element 
to this response, as large organizations regarded 
engaging with TDM as part of their corporate 
responsibility to the city. Their response mirrors 
Waitt’s (2003) altruistic themes of community and 
national spirit, international promotions, and future 
business investment. The success of “soft” mea-
sures (Moser & Bamberg, 2008) employed by TfL 
in their engagement strategy is encouraging. These 
results contradict Loukopoulos’s (2007) findings 
on the effectiveness of “soft measures.” Businesses 
viewing participating in TDM as part of their CSR 
strategy also concur with Roby’s (2010) findings 
on work-placed travel plans. However, it is ques-
tionable whether these organizations would have 
had such a positive evaluation of the exchange if 
this was not a prestigious one-off event.
Education was an essential component of TfL’s 
engagement strategy for medium-sized businesses as 
they had no prior understanding of the requirements 
of TDM. There was a belief that TfL would provide 
alternative options to alleviate any possible disrup-
tion. The lack of alternatives resulted in the anteced-
ent of reciprocity not being met. The message from 
TfL was consistent with that given to large organiza-
tions. However, these businesses’ responses were that 
benefit, and the justice principle. The event itself, its 
prestige and kudos, will also impact on this evalu-
ation. The TDM requirements are distilled into an 
engagement strategy that promotes the antecedent 
conditions that are required for a positive exchange 
relationship. Rationality is the business evaluation 
of the reward that engaging in TDM measures will 
provide, while satisfying benefits is weighing the 
balance of the cost of engaging in TDM against the 
cost of not doing so. For a positive outcome, busi-
nesses must believe that by engaging in TDM and 
employing a reduce, retime, remode, or reroute 
strategy, the transport infrastructure will cope and 
their operation will be able to continue as effec-
tively as possible.
The cost–benefit analysis enables the businesses 
to evaluate the resource exchange as being at a 
satisfactory level and, thus, meeting the satisfying 
benefit antecedent. Reciprocity is evident when the 
level of planning and resources employed by TfL 
are evaluated as equal by businesses in relation to 
their planned engagement with TDM. The fairness 
or the justice principle of the exchange is gained 
by involvement of large businesses in the planning 
process, by the one to one consultants, and the use 
of extensive modeling that allows businesses to 
trust the data.
Businesses that are unaware of TDM will not 
engage in the exchange relationship and, there-
fore, there is no response or plans to change travel 
behavior. However, businesses that are aware 
and engaged enter into an exchange relationship. 
Depending on the balance they will evaluate the 
exchange as either positive or negative. This will 
then produce differing reactions depending on the 
evaluation and the level of perceived impact.
TfL’s communication to large organizations, 
through their “Site Specific Advice” program, was 
very effective in informing these companies of the 
implications of TDM and encouraging engage-
ment. Though most of these companies did not 
require the expertise of a one-to-one consultant, 
this personalized service was an effective strategy 
to ensure their support. The antecedents of ratio-
nality, reciprocity, and satisfying benefit were 
realized by these companies as they clearly under-
stood the impact of the Games on their operations. 
They understood that by engaging with TDM, 
they could lesson negative impacts. Although this 
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nature, it meant that it was difficult for TfL to engage 
them early in the planning process. They gleaned 
much of their information through the press or via 
trade associations, as direct involvement with TfL 
was limited. However, there was little they could do 
in the sense of retime, reroute, remode, or reduce. 
TfL concentrated on managing their expectations 
and providing advice for their business continuity. 
Our research identified that many small businesses 
were ill informed and, consequently, they were very 
concerned about the impact of TDM on their opera-
tions. They found themselves in a relationship with 
little control or influence and became increasingly 
negative as to the benefits the Games may bring. 
Consequently, antecedents were not realized, result-
ing in no engagement or creating an imbalance in the 
exchange, resulting in a negative evaluation. This 
is similar to Waitt’s (2003) findings where, as the 
Games neared, Sydney residents became increas-
ingly more negative. Also Cheng and Jarvis’ (2010) 
study identified that perceptions of road congestion 
resulted in an imbalance in the exchanges as resi-
dents did not realize any benefits. Although fearful 
of the short-term effects on their continued opera-
tions, London’s small businesses were still hopeful 
for the longer term benefits the Games might bring. 
Comparison cannot be made with Waitt’s (2003) 
altruistic themes. For these small businesses, which 
had been struggling to cope in a difficult economic 
climate, their individual business survival took pre-
cedence over any altruistic tendencies.
The impact of messages derived from the media 
was identified to be a powerful tool in influencing 
certain areas of the business community to realize 
antecedents necessary for the exchange. Though 
this could work in TfL’s favor, as it enhanced 
awareness and evoked action. Some messages did 
become distorted and resulted in an increase in 
negative attitudes. Small businesses not receiving 
a coherent message direct from TfL were particu-
larly receptive to this channel of communication. 
TfL claimed to have little or no influence over the 
media. However, by being proactive and ensur-
ing the correct information was clearly available, 
including the use of third parties, certain aspects 
of the negativity could have been reduced and may 
have helped realize some aspect of the anteced-
ents, allowing for a more positive evaluation of the 
exchange. As Tim alluded to in his interview, it was 
they could not or would not reduce but would, where 
essential, implement a retiming policy. This partial 
engagement would indicate an imbalance within the 
exchange for these businesses. Although TfL did 
not achieve planning for a significant reduction in 
the base load from all the medium-sized businesses 
interviewed, they did achieve some TDM objectives, 
in particular “retime.” Their engagement ensured 
some of these businesses realized antecedents of 
rationality, and satisfying benefit, as they valued the 
information and the ability to make informed deci-
sions. The information provided allowed for some 
balance in the exchange as these organizations could 
ensure “business continuity” and also support Tfl’s 
“Transport Reputation Management,” two key aims 
of the TDM project. Elements of the justice principle 
were also apparent as the organizations that attended 
TfL’s business engagement presentations believed 
that they were well informed. They appreciated the 
level of engagement and, due to the extensive model-
ing that TfL had undertaken, trusted the information 
provided to identify the level of impact on their busi-
ness. Although only some of the antecedents were 
realized, this allowed for a balance in the exchange 
and a positive evaluation and some engagement in 
TDM. This differs from Ap (1992), where all ante-
cedents need to be realized for a positive outcome.
However, Ap (1992) and Sutton (1967) identi-
fied involvement in the planning process, trust, and 
the evaluation of fairness as important elements in 
the exchange relationship. Nunkoo et al.’s (2012) 
research further supports this, suggesting that trust 
in government planning and a feeling of empower-
ment leads to support. These businesses may not 
appear to have a high level of control in relations 
between themselves and TfL, but their positive atti-
tude and subsequent level of engagement could be 
seen as a consequence of their understanding and 
acceptance of the need for TDM, their trust in the 
data provided, and their belief that the Games would 
have a positive impact on the city. Those businesses 
directly impacted by the road restrictions of the 
ORN had little choice to engage. Due to TfL’s pro-
active involvement, these businesses understood the 
requests made of them and so the antecedents for a 
balanced exchange were realized.
Engagement with small organizations and micro-
businesses was more problematic. With such a large 
number of organizations, and their “short-termist” 
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This is especially important when these organiza-
tions do not believe they will directly benefit from 
the event. To encourage exchange authorities have 
to implement a comprehensive and targeted engage-
ment policy. To realize the antecedents necessary for 
a positive exchange, business must fully understand 
the implications of their actions or inactions and the 
effect this could have on the transport network, their 
business continuity, and the success of the event. The 
importance of the event could evoke a “responsibili-
ties to the wider community” view. This “responsi-
bility” may have acted as a driver for change by large 
businesses that were happy to engage with TDM 
measures even in the knowledge that it would incur 
additional costs. Medium and smaller-sized busi-
nesses, though supportive of the event, rely on the 
resilience of their employees to ensure minimal dis-
ruption, and costs are kept to an absolute minimum. 
Individuals’ engagement with TDM was not in this 
study’s remit and further research into the employer–
employee relationship in engaging in such policies is 
recommended to shed further light on this complex 
engagement process for mega-events.
The Olympics is regarded as the most prestigious 
event a city can hold, yet many businesses inter-
viewed were not prepared, or able, to take steps to 
help reduce the base load, despite a comprehensive 
and proactive communication strategy. Therefore, to 
ensure success, a tailored communication approach 
specific to the size of organization is recommended. 
As our research has shown, for a positive exchange 
to occur most of the antecedents need to be realized, 
the larger organizations felt in control, well briefed, 
and able and willing to comply with the require-
ments of TDM. Smaller organizations, depending on 
the level of communication, complied to a lesser and 
varying extent. It could be argued that TfL’s strat-
egy was comprehensive and capable of achieving its 
goal of “influencing enough people enough,” but as 
our study has shown, many organizations were not 
influenced enough. Early consultation with organi-
zations whose operations were directly affected by 
TDM could have diffused some inaccuracies and 
unnecessary negativities. A more targeted cam-
paign focused at small and medium-sized businesses 
through organizations such as FSB could also have 
alleviated fears and helped correct the imbalance 
in the exchange relationship. It would not be real-
istic to expect TfL’s strategy to be able to influence 
the FSB that initiated dialogue with TfL to ensure 
the correct information was being communicated.
Whether the transport authorities directly used 
the press to shock stakeholders into reaction is dif-
ficult to confirm. Nevertheless, there is a belief that 
scare tactics have been used in transport manage-
ment for previous Olympic Games (Clean Air in 
London, 2011; Currie, 1998; Shawcross, 2011) and, 
as our interviewees noted, stories in the press are 
very effective at encouraging engaging with TDM. 
Scare tactics are also evident in TfL’s presentations 
as the image of “Atlanta” so clearly demonstrates. 
It is evident that to ensure business engagement in 
TDM, the message needs to be understood and acted 
on and the use of horror stories would appear to be 
part of that process. The confusion of the 100 days 
of the ORN is a case in point. Originally, business 
believed the 100 days story, imagining that the 
restrictions would be “devastating.” However, they 
were so relieved by the clarification of the reduced 
period that they were happy to comply and engaged 
proactively with the more limited restrictions.
The exchange relationship between business 
and the authorities will not necessarily involve 
all antecedents but their presence or absence will 
affect the balance of the exchange relationship (Ap, 
1992), and thereby the outcome and their level of 
engagement. The results indicate that the size of the 
organization and level of control affect the ability 
to realize antecedents in the exchange relationship. 
Where the antecedent conditions are not met or 
companies have not been part of the engagement 
process, they bypass the exchange relationship. 
Where the event has prestige, such as the Olym-
pic Games, it influences the antecedent conditions. 
An element of altruism is evident when a company, 
for the greater good, goes beyond what is requested 
by the authorities, which could be attributed to its 
CSR. The desire for future participation is limited 
for events such as the Olympic Games as it is usu-
ally held in a location once in a lifetime.
Conclusion
This research adds to the knowledge of mega-
event management and the processes required for 
successful policy engagement. It is important to 
understand how business reacts to requests to ensure 
the success of an event made of them by authorities. 
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most businesses. However, due to the uncertainty 
of compliance levels, lessons should be learned to 
ensure better engagement from these more marginal-
ized organizations. The influence of “scare stories” 
should not be overlooked. However, authorities need 
to evaluate the implications of using such tactics as 
they may not always have the desired effect.
If the event does not have the popular appeal 
of the Olympic Games, which encourages an ele-
ment of altruistic behavior, authorities may need to 
identify and promote positive aspects of the event 
to help influence the realization of antecedents 
necessary to ensure a mutually positive exchange. 
Consideration needs to be given to the fact that this 
TDM policy cost £30 million (Currie et al., 2013) 
and had no tangible deliverables. If this TDM 
approach achieves its objectives, will this cost be 
viewed as efficient use of resources, and what are 
its legacy impacts, if any?
This is an exploratory study involving a relative 
small number of businesses. To test these initial 
findings into impacts of mega-events on businesses, 
a larger sample would be recommended. To identify 
the success factors of the TDM strategy, research 
including interviewing the same businesses post-
Games would also be recommended and the role of 
this TDM policy in producing a sustainable legacy 
for the city needs to be evaluated.
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